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There has been relatively little effort in the literature to systematic­
-ally deal with the role of financial institutions and policies in the con-
text of development. 1 Not unlike conventional macro-economics focussing 
on the mature industrial world, such considerations customarily assume 
their place in the sun mainly when we enter into discussions of the short 
run but are relegated to a separate and unequal status in considerations 
of the long run. Admittedly, business cycle problems rear their ugly head 
in both the rich and the poor countries; but their importance in the supply­
constrained Say's Law environment of the developing world is surely much 
smaller--and thus the cost of the relative neglect of the financial dimen­
sion much larger. 
We can perhaps achieve agreement on this without too much difficulty; 
but where to start and how to insert the analytical scalpel is quite 
another matter. This paper is not so presumptuous as to attempt a specific 
answer; it is intended to do little more than suggest one possibly fruitful 
avenue of approach. The heart of that approach is a plea for more his­
torical and typological sensitivity. There is, we believe, relatively 
1For some of the few exceptions, see Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial
Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); J. G.
Gurley, "Financial Structures in Developing Economies," in David Krivine, ed.,
Rehovoth Conference on Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing States
(New York: Praeger, 1967); Ronald I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic
Development (Washington: Brookings, 1973); H. T. Patrick, "Financial Develop­
ment and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, January 1966; Edward s·. Shaw, Financial Deepening in
Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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little mileage in analyzing the role of financial institutions in "the" 
developing economy irrespective of time or place. In fact, an awareness 
of such typological and/or historical differences may be an essential 
ingredient if we are to be in a position to treat the financial sector as 
an integral part of the development problem rather than as an isolated, 
if fascinating, afterthought. 
We take as our starting point Kuznets' apt definition of the develop­
ment problem as an attempt at transition from a long epoch of agrarianism 
to a long epoch of modern growth. Such a transition, if successful at all, 
is likely to last 20 to 50 years or more and is itself, moreover, likely 
to be composed of a number of distinct sub-phases during which the develop­
mental characteristics of the society undergo substantial change. Specific­
ally, developing societies seem to first move out of dependent (or colonial) 
agrarianism into independent (or post-colonial) primary import substitution; 
from there into either secondary import substitution or export substitution; 
and finally, if successful, into modern growth. Each phase or sub-phase, 
moreover, has differing requirements, if transition is to be achieved, with 
reference to the nature of the appropriate financial institutions and policies. 
This is the basic framework within which we will be operating. We 
hasten to reassure the reader on two counts. One, we do not believe in any 
"inevitable" historical stages of growth; however, if one does observe 
marked changes in endowment, in the pattern of resource utilization, and 
in policy over time indicating gradual changes of the rules of the game, 
there is no reason to permit the ghost of Rostow to forever scare us off. 
Secondly, we recognize.that "natura non facit saltum"--not even when countries 
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would like to--and that the movement from one sub-phase of growth to 
another must be viewed not as a quick orderly switch but rather as a 
gradual and irregular transition over a period of years, with many charac­
teristics remaining unchanged, with others changing randomly, and only the 
behavioral center of gravity undergc,ing predictable variation. 
In Section II we briefly describe the main outlines of the typical 
LDC transition process in the ideal sense and then attempt to relate it 
to the idealized changing role of financial institutions and policies. 
Historical Japanese and contemporary Taiwanese experience will be viewed 
as a proto-type. Section III is devoted to an analysis and explanation 
of the preponderance of real world deviations from this ideal pattern-­
on both the real and financial fronts. Philippine and Brazilian 
experience will be cited. Section IV, finally, is devoted to a summary 
of findings and to the conclusions for policy emanating from the analysis. 
II. The "Deviant 11 LDC in Transition 
The curtain of historical development may be arbitrarily raised on 
the so-called colonial agrarian epoch when the overseas territories have 
already been impacted by the investment, trade and (sometimes) political 
and military presence of the (then already advanced) Western world. The 
essential, necessarily caricatured, characteristics of that period include 
the existence of a raw materials or minerals intensive export-oriented 
enclave, complete with ancillary services and (limited) auxiliary industrial 
activities, side by side with a relatively large and relatively stagnant 
food producing agricultural hinterland. The proceeds of this natural 
resources-based export activity are deployed in part to finance the luxury 
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consumption needs of the domestic and foreign elite, in part to provide 
industrial consumer goods to help pull workers out of subsistence agricul­
ture and into enclave activities, and in part reinvested in the further 
expansion of these activities--or reinvested abroad. 
2 
The financial structure to accommodate the requirements of such a 
dependent economic system are as quickly summarized. With respect to the 
larger, relatively stagnant, agricultural hinterland, any system approaching 
the "circular flow" of the physiocrats makes minimum demands on financial 
institutions and policies. This is not to deny that the absolute volume of 
traditional finance for traditional purposes may be substantial in toto. 
To the extent domestic trade gradually expands, the demand for capital other 
than of the traditional wages fund variety, of course, also expands, e.g., 
3 
for roads, transport, marketing facilities, etc. But while the money economy 
is bound to be gradually displacing pure barter, to the extent little is 
happening on the real side, little is required on the financial side, either 
to lead or to accommodate. 
Most of the dynamic activity--both real and financial--is focussed in 
the export enclave and those services and industrial activities which facili­
tate :!.+.: .. functioning and expansion. An important component of that accommodating 
&ervice sector activity is, in fact, the banking function, sometimes tied up 
2
Whether or not net foreign investment takes place, or capital is re­
patriat"d, depends mainly--aside from political considerations--on the foreign 
demand 1,rospects for the enclave product, relative to other opportunities 
facing the foreign investor. Moreover, as McKinnon has pointed out, "insofar 
as indigenous individuals in the colony participated in the process of bank 
interme('iation, they were depositors rather than borrowers" (McKinnon, oz. cit.). 
3
See Fei and Ranis, "Economic Development in Historical Perspective," 
American Economic Review, May 1969. 
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with management and enclave operations in the form of the East India 
Company proto-type--as a forerunner of the modern multinational corporation-­
more often an expatriate specialized bank at the service of the exporting 
and investing elite, foreign and domestic. 
4 
For our purposes the colonial agrarian epoch is of interest mainly 
by way of contrast with what follows. Once political independence is 
achieved--after World War II in most developing countries, earlier in 
Latin America--governments almost invariably attempt to restructure co1onial 
production and trade patterns to facilitate national development. This 
effort most often takes the, by now well-known, form of a primary import 
substitution sub-phase. The overriding objective becomes the creation 
and/or expansion of the industrial sector, especially in previously 
imported consumer goods, and of the services and overheads required to 
facilitate that exp~sion. The main tool is government's acquisition of 
control over the traditional export earnings and their reallocation to 
industry and overheads via exchange controls and licensing. These are the 
bare essentials of import substitution. Usually they are accompanied by 
substantial protection of the fledgling industries, either via tariffs, 
often via import quotas, accompanied by expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies and associated with inflation and an increasingly over­
more 
valued exchange rate--all intended to drive complementary domestic resources 
into the same hands. 
4Foreign branch banks were integrated exclusively into the system 
of the metropole (see E. Nevin, Capital Funds in Underdevelo ed Countries: 
The Role of Financial Institutions, St. Martins Press, London, 1961. 
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Much has been written in criticism of the import substitution policy 
oping countries. to add to it here. 
But, faithful to our historical perspective, we will simply assert that 
such a sub-phase is likely to be an important ingredient for a successful 
synd rome in' deve l . ' 
5 We do not wish 
transition to economic maturity whenever entrepreneurial capacity is 
initially weak and physical (especially rural) infrastructure deficient. 
In other words, we believe that an infant industry/infant entrepreneurial 
argument in general has merit and that much of the criticism of import 
substitution along the Little-Scitovsky-Scott lines is really--and quite 
.properly--directed towards the question of how much, what kind, and for 
how long. 
6 
If that is the case, we can proceed to the question of the appropriate 
role of financial institutions and policies in the context of the primary 
import substitution sub-phase of transition. The banking system clearly 
represents an important additional instrument in the government's effort to 
shift resources, domestic as well as foreign, into the hands of the nascent 
industrial entrepreneurial class (or possibly into the government's own hands 
overhead construction and/or in 
wherever the public sector is involired i1)1directly productive activities). 
It accomplishes this, in part, by holding government debt and assuming the 
role of docile partner to government deficit financing efforts. Floors 
5 see, in particular, Little, Scitovsky, and Scott, Industry and Trade 
in Some Developing Countries--A Comparative Study, Oxford University Press, 
1970. Also, Benjamin Cohen and Gustav Ranis, "Import Liberalization and 
Growth: The Second Post-War Restructuring," in Government and Economic 
Development, G. Ranis ( ed. ) , Yale University Press, 1971. 
6For a fuller statement, see the author's "Relative Prices in Planning 
for Economic Development, 11 in International Comparisons of Prices and Output , 
D. J. Daly, ed., NBER, 1972, as well as the exchange with Eckstein, Ruggles 
and Stolper which follows. 
-7-
are often placed under banks' holdings of "safe" low interest government 
. 
bonds and ceilings on their holdings of other "unsafe" assets to accomplish 
this purpose. In this nominal sense financial institutions accommodate 
the government's needs, usually in the absence of an adequate fiscal 
capacity, to force some saving via the process of inflation and to simul­
taneously shift the functional distribution of income in favor of profits. 
Interest rate policy represents another important instrument in the 
arsenal of import substitution. By keeping official rates low (often nega­
tive in real terms) governments claim to be encouraging overall investment 
(which, given the customarily high marginal efficiency of capital, is doubt­
ful) while channeling the limited credit available into the hands of the 
new industrial elite. The Central Bank similarly shifts the foreign ex­
change proceeds, which must now be surrendered, to the same favored class 
at artificially low (overvalued) rates of exchange. There is an attempt 
to bring in as much foreign capital as possible--initially, aid and, 
increasingly with time, private capital on very favorable terms. 
7 The 
financial system thus serves the import substitution regime's main purpose 
of shifting resources and providing unearned profits to the new consumer 
goods industries. 
During this period there clearly exists a premium on "getting things 
done," with relatively little concern with its level of efficiency or in­
efficiency. It is the brute act of saving and its redirection which is the 
7Th . . . . . . . . e incentives given to private capital during this period often far 
exceed what is required to attract it,and carry the seeds of later dis­
satisfaction and conflict. For a fuller analysis, see the author's, "The 
Multinational Corporation as an Instrument of Development," in The Multi'.'" 
national Corporation and Development, Lewis Goodman and David Apter, eds. , 
forthcoming, 1976, Yale University Press. 
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overriding objective, not the finer points of efficient allocation and 
management. Traditional raw material exports--supplemented by foreign 
capital--continue to provide the main foreign exchange fuel for the primary 
import substitution industrialization process. Domestic saving emanates 
from the direct reinvestment of industrial profits and from the surpluses 
generated by agriculture. Even the less extreme import substitution policy 
packages, if not single-mindedly industry-oriented, tend to discriminate 
against domestic food producing agriculture--e.g., via unfavorable terms 
of trade, infrastructural neglect, overvalued exchange rates, etc.; con­
sequently, the contribution of agricultural saving, the main source of 
household saving, is likely to be limited. 
More modest or flexible manifestations of primary import substitution, 
8
such as experienced by Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
or by Taiwan in the 19SO's, are, on the other hand, quite consistent with 
substantial increases in agricultural productivity and the substantial 
contribution of agricultural saving from the beginning. Nineteenth century 
Japanese agricultural surpluses, either captured by the government via the land 
tax.or channeled through private hands, provided the lion's share of the 
9
system's investment funds, especially in the early years. But the heavy 
Japanese attention to food producing agriculture, even during import 
8
The "mildness" partially enforced by extraterritoriality which re­
stricted Japan's ability to maintain high protective tariffs. And, perhaps 
luckily for Japan, Schacht had not yet been born. 
9The land tax, for example, provided more than 70% of total government 
revenue in the 1870's and 1880's and rent, mostly non-consumed, close to 
60% of net agricultural output. (See G. Ranis, "Financing Japanese Economic 
Development," Economic History Review, XI, No. 3, 1959.) 
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substitution, transmitted also to her colonies, seems to be rather unique. 
Private saving in agriculture, if it does make a contribution, will, 
of course, continue to do so mainly in the form of direct investment in 
tangible assets such as the improve~ent of land via levelling, draining, 
etc., and the construction of other mini-infrastructure. As in the 
Robinson Crusoe case, in the absence of much agricultural-non-agricultural 
sector interaction, the preponderance of financial intermediation in this 
sub-phase is likely to proceed via the individual himself, or his family, 
and substantially back into agricultural activity. If food producing 
agriculture is relatively dynamic, as in Japan, some of these savings will 
flow into non-agricultural rural activities, for example, into silk produc­
tion, cotton weaving, etc., which constituted more than 30% of the income 
of Japanese farmers by the end of the 19th century. In either case, the 
financial intermediation effort is focussed on the quantity of savings­
After all, we do not know how good Crusoeinvestment, not on its quality. 
was at constructing his first fishing rod. 
As is well known, this primary import substitution sub-phase of transi­
tion growth is bound to run out of steam sooner or later as LDC domestic 
markets for consumer goods are gradually exhausted. It is at this juncture 
that the society typically faces the crucial decision of whether or not to 
gradually shift to a non-traditional industrial export orientation, or to 
persist with import substitution, this time of the secondary variety-­
including capital goods, consumer durables and processing industries. 
If rec~nt LDC history is any guide, the majority of developing 
societies seem to prefer remaining on an import substitution course--if at 
all possible. Especially if the natural resources base is sufficiently 
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strong to continue to provide the fuel for this ever more capital and 
technology intensive process, such a societal choice is very understandable 
since it presents the path of least (especially political) resistance. 
Strong vested interests such as the new urban industrial class benefitting 
from the high temperatures of the import substitution "hot house," and 
the civil service whose power (and sometimes income) derives in large part 
from the typical control system are naturally loath to give it up. As long 
as the natural resources don't give out--either on the (domestic) supply 
or (foreign) demand side--growth can thus be maintained--even though, at 
least for the labor surplus economy, it becomes ever more inefficient. 
However, the costs of continuing this strategy in terms of such other 
increasingly important development objectives as the reduction of under­
10employment and income redistribution, may rise ove~ time. 
In Section III, we intend to further analyze the situation in the 
preponderant (non-deviant) majority of contemporary developing countries 
which seem to have chosen secondary import substitution. But first it is, 
we believe, instructive to deal with the path a few deviant countries have 
taken at the end of their primary import substitution sub-phase, namely 
that of e,,port substitution, or a shift to non-traditional exports of the 
labor-intensive industrial type. Japan in an earlier day and Taiwan more 
recently undoubtedly chose this path, mainly under the pressure of their 
10Much more could be said on this important subject but this essay 
is not the place. See, however, Chenery, et. al., Redistribution with 
Growth, Oxford, 1974• 
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fundamental long-term natural resources scarcity. It is this direction 
which we consider "ideal" for at least the garden variety of labor surplus 
developing countries--even those, like the Philippines, and much of Latin 
America, with a substantially better natural resources base--and which 
requires, in turn, "ideal" changes in their financial institutions and 
financial policy framework. 
The export substitution sub-phase is most easily--and briefly--described 
in relation to the presumed change in the economy's capacity to participate 
in international trade on a more competitive basis. If the major intended 
purposesof import substitution have indeed been achieved, i.e., the matura­
tion of a newly emerging industrial entrepreneurial class and the construc­
tion of missing infrastructure, e.g., in agriculture, in the field of financial 
intermediation, and elsewhere, the economy should now be ready to increasingly 
expose itself to competition in the international markets for industrial 
consumer goods. 
Such changes cannot realistically be effected overnight, nor are zig-zags 
of policy and performance likely to be avoided; but the overall tendency is 
clear; if the infant industry argum~nt has merit, the labor surplus economy 
should increasingly be in a position to shift from traditional land-based 
to non-traditional labor-based exports in its foreign trade and to a sub­
stantial increase in the level of mutual interaction between agri-
culture and non-agriculture on the domestic front. 
The changes in the general policy package required to accommodate 
this change in the production and trading pattern are equally clear: 
gradual liberalization of a number of markets previously controlled, 
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directly or indirectly, by governrnent,rnainly on behalf of the new industrial 
class. Specifically, we would expect foreign exchange controls to yield 
to tariffs, and tariffs in turn to be gradually lowered, while the exchange 
rate is initially devalued and then maintained at a more realistic level 
(if necessary, by frequent quasi-routinized, e.g., quarterly, adjustments); 
simultaneously we would expect there to be less need for deficit financing 
as both the government's tax base and fiscal capacity and the system's 
voluntary saving potential increase--hence a reduction of inflationary 
pressures; finally, and most important from the point of view of this paper, 
we would expect monetary refonn to take place, focussing on substantially 
higher rates of interest and the consequent reduction of subsidies and the 
role of credit rationing in investment decisions. 
With the reduction of inflation and monetary reform yielding more 
realistic real rates of interest, the differentials between official credit 
markets and the unofficial or "parallel" markets are bound to diminish, 
and the scope for an expanding network of financial intermediation likely 
to increase substantially. With domestic credit as well as foreign capital 
now priced more realistically, the market can be expected to have a larger 
(though still by no means exclusive) hand in determining allocations and 
enterprise survival patterns. 
All this, of course, depends on the existence of the proper dynamically 
flexible institutional framework--whether it is to lead or to accommodate 
11 
the increased desires of households and unincorporated businesses. 
11 see Patrick's distinction in "Financial Development and Economic 
Growth in Underdeveloped Countries," op. cit. 
. 
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Government intervention, in fact, shifts from the force-feeding of desig­
nated industrialists, via the assignment of unearned profits, to the sub­
sidization of a more and more varied and sophisticated institutional 
construction program by the public sector. Increasingly as the real 
economy becomes more export and efficiency-oriented, the brute act of 
saving, fairly well served by intermediation through the family in agricul­
/ 
ture and by the reinvestment of industrial profits in both rural and urban 
industry gives way to the need for greater efficiency in the allocation 
process. This is tantamount to the increased need for a specialized 
financial intermediation network serving the ever more demanding require­
ments of differentiated industrial activities. To return to our homely 
Robinson Crusoe analogy, interdependence in a competitive inter-island 
market would sooner or later require him to seek out efficient investors 
to match his saving effort. 
If markets, especially foreign, are to be continuously expanded, the 
system will require an equally expanding and increasingly specialized 
financial intermediation network. Specialized banks, insurance and pension 
funds, savings and loan institutions--finally even bond and stock markets--
can be expected to increase in importance as the portfolio needs of savers 
become more and more sophisticated and the distance between them and the 
equally more sophisticated investors grows. Thus, the relationship between 
money, quasi-money and GNP and that between the assets of all financial in­
stitutions and GNP, Goldsmith's financial intermediation ratio, are all likely 
to rise in periods of rapid LDC growth, as the economy makes its way through 




direction of causality, he has found that the rate of growth of financial 
intermediation is positively associated with the rate of growth in real 
12
terms. 
Japan's historically mild import substitution during the early Meiji 
period gave way to an increased export orientation, accompanied by a larger 
role for market forces, near the turn of the century. While raw silk was 
the main export crop initially, cotton textiles constituted 35% of her total 
imports, and Japan did not become a net exporter of cotton yarn and cloth 
until about 1900. The policy shift from government ownership of major 
industries and the favoring of large scale private industries via subsidies 
and preferential interest rates took place during the same period. Japanese 
experience illustrates that, if the period of protection under mild import 
substitution is used well, much of the infrastructure required for later 
successful export substitution will have been laid and can continue to be 
gradually expanded thereafter. One example, of course, is in agriculture 
where early public sector irrigation, research and education investments had 
a substantial and sustained pay-off. Another is in the area of the creation 
of an appropriate financial infrastructure. Postal savings were organized 
early in the Meiji period, taking advantage of the well-understood (and 
trusted) functions of an integrated national postal system. Small savers 
in large numbers (if not large amounts per capita) were attracted by this 
form of intermediation which, along with the land tax, helped finance 
government infrastructural expenditures. Increasingly in the course of 
12 see Raymond W. Goldsmith, £.E_• cit., p. 48. 
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the 19th centu_ry, public and private commercial branch banking was estab­
13
lished in rural areas, savings banks spread, government bonds were issued 
to households (instead of only to banks) and an increasingly diversified 
banking system took shape. Special banks were created for foreign trade, for 
longer term investments in overheads, in industry and in the colonies. As 
Patrick has pointed out: "between 1868 and 1914 Japan's financial system••• 
developed rapidly into a modern, pervasiv~ variegated system, providing a 
wide spectrum of financial services. 11
14 
The effective channelization of agricultural surpluses, aided by substan­
tially positive real rates of interest (see Table 1), continued to be important 
in Japan after the turn of the century. The agricul-
tural sector remained a substantial net contributor to non-agricultural 
investment and, increasingly, industrial profits as well were committed to financial 
intermediation, especially via banks, in place of the virtually exclusive 
pattern of the reinvestment of industrial profits of the 19th century. On 
the other hand, we may note that securities markets and corporate bonds 
played no major role until after World War II. 
The successful overall performance of the Japanese economy during 
this period is well known. Agricultural labor productivity increased in 
a sustained,if unspectacular,fashion throughout the period, as did GNP 
(see Table 1), keeping well ahead (low rates of) population growth. 
13
sometimes in the form of "quasi-banks" which were multi-purpose 
institutions growing out of trade and cash crop related credit advances. 
14H. Patrick, "Japan, 1868-1914," in Banking in the Early Stages of 
Industrialization, Rondo Cameron, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967. This seems to be borne out in.current unpublished research by Goldsmith. 
See also the high level of monetization (not including time deposits) reflected 
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(% of GNP) 
7 
1887 3.9 .3 5.3 5,5 9.8 10.l 12.6 
1888 3.6 3.8 1.1 5.0 3.9 9.6 8,5 12.6 
1889 4.4 3.7 2.6 4.9 2.3 9.7 7.1 13.0 
1890 2.7 3,6 0 4.8 4.8 9.6 9.6 13.7 
1891 3.4 3.5 .5 4.7 4.2 9.0 8.5 13.5 
1892 3.0 3.4 0 4.8 4.8 8.8 8.8 13,5 
1893 4.9 3.3 .6 4.8 4. 5 8.8 8.2 15.7 
1894 2.8 3.2 3.4 4.9 1.5 8.7 5.3 16.5 
1895 2.9 3.1 7.1 5.2 -1. 9 9.1 2.0 16.5 
1896 2.5 3.0 8,5 5.7 -2.8 9.9 1.4 16.8 
1897 3.0 3.0 6.8 6.0 - .0 9.8 3.0 17.0 
1898 1.5 2.9 - 7,3 6.3 1 10.1 2.8 14.9 
1899 2.4 2.9 4.9 6.7 1.8 10.6 5,7 14.0 
1900 2,3 2.8 3,4 6.9 3,5 10.6 7.2 13.6 
1901 1.6 2,8 2.7 6.7 4.0 10.1 7.4 13.1 
1902 2.4 2.8 4,3 6.5 2.2 10.0 5.7 11.3 
1903 1. 8 2.7 2.6 6.3 3.7 9.7 7.1 9.7 
1904 .224 1.0 2.6 3.4 5.9 2.5 9.1 5.7 9.6 
1905 .230 2.1 2.6 4.7 5,6 .9 8.7 4.0 10.1 
1906 .231 2.5 2.5 3.1 5.7 2.6 8.9 5,8 10.4 
1907 .238 • 8 2.5 1.8 5.6 3.8 8.9 7.1 12.1 
1908 .241 3.0 2.4 1.1 5.4 4.3 8.6 7.5 14.2 
1909 .240 3.3 2.4 2.2 5.1 2.9 8.2 6.0 14.5 
1910 .237 2.6 2.3 1.2 5.1 3.9 8.1 6.9 14.3 
1911 .235 2.2 2.3 2.5 5.1 2. 7.9 5,4 14.2 
1912 .233 1.8 2.2 1.7 5.3 3,6 8.0 6.3 14,4 
1913 .227 1.7 2.2 .3 5.4 5.1 8.2 7.9 15.3 
1914 .227 3.1 2.1 .4 5.4 5.0 8.3 7.9 17.4 
1915 .227 4.9 2.1 3.9 5.2 1.3 8.2 4.3 20.8 
1916 .230 6,5 2.0 10.2 5.0 -5.2 7.9 -2.3 23.6 
1917 .226 7.3 2.0 18.4 4,9 -13,5 7.7 -10.7 24.6 
1918 .233 6.7 2.7 20.6 5.2 -15.4 8.1 -12. 5 24.8 
1919 .245 5.7 2.7 17.3 5.5 -11.8 8.6 -8.7 22,5 
1920 .260 3,4 2.7 12.4 5.9 -6.5 9.0. -3.4 19.5 





















1924 .291 .6 1.8 -1.0 6.3 7.3 9.6 10.6 13.8 
1925 • 287 1.8 1.8 -1.0 6.3 7.3 9.6 10,6 13.8 
1926 .282 4,0 1.8 -1.6 6.1 7.7 9.4 11.0 14,3 


















































































(1) M = (cash currency and depo~it currency). 
Cash currency= currency in circulation - cash holdings bv financial institutions 
Deposit cu~rency = demand deposits of all banks - checks, etc. held by banks. 
(source: Historical 
Statistics of Japanese Econom , Bank of Japan, 1962 [HSJE]). 
Since 1868,GNP (current): at market prices in Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Ja an 
K. Ohkawa, et al, ed., Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1974, Vol. 1 LTES 
(2) From LTES. 
(3) Refers to those employed less those engaged in agriculture and forestry. (From Hundred-Year Statistics 
of the Japanese Economy, Tokyo, Bank of Japan, 1966,) 
(4) Change in consumer prices from previous year (from LTES, op. cit., Vol. 8), 
(5) Tokyo banks: from HSJE. 
(6) Tokyo banks: through 1929: "loans on deeds" from HSJE; from 193,0: "loans onJ:1ills" from HSJE. 
(7) Series disregards statistical discrepancies, from LTES. GNP (current) as in (1) 
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Saving rates, initially modest, rose to more than 20% by World War I; the 
sustained, if unspectacular, nature of this balanced export-oriented growth 
path yielded rates of labor reallocation sufficiently rapid to culminate 
in the end of the labor surplus condition by that time. 15 
Turning to Taiwan, the case of a contemporary LDC moving 
· along a more sharply delineated "ideal" path, we may note (see 
Table 2) that typical, relatively low, real interest 
rates in official markets-~along with a much higher informal market--were 
adhered to during the import substitution sub-phase of the 1950 1 s, though 
nominal rates were set higher than in most post-war LDC's in the effort to 
curb the inflationary psychology. At the same time productivity in agricul­
ture increased consistently,while land reforms and infrastructural invest­
ments combined to prepare the ground for fuller participation later on. 
The shift from import to export substitution,accommodated by major 
changes in the policy package,occurred in the early 1960's. Stabilization and 
a decline in the rate of inflation was followed by devaluation coupled with 
import control liberalization and a substantial increase in the nominal 
rate of interest. As a consequence, the real rate of interest rose from 
an average of 10% in 1958-1960 to close to 15% in 1963-65. At the same 
time the interest rate in the unofficial or''parallel" markets, deprived of 
some of their monopoly content, declined from levels of 50% on average in the 
late SO's to the vicinity of 25% per annum in the 60 1 s. 
15At least in agriculture. The controversy on the date of the "turning 
point''need not detain us here. (See R. Minami, "The Turning Point in the 




Rate of Deposits 
Real Non-Agricultural Inflation (Average of Interest o
n Gross 
3-Year GDP Labor Absorption (% price change 6 month and Secured Savini= 
from 1 year rates) Loans RateMoving Average Growth ( % change from 
(% of GICentered on GDP (current) Rate revious ear) revious ear) Nominal Real Nominal Real 
3 4 (5 6 7)1 2 
1954 .114 8.5 4.1 10.l 26.9 16.8 8.4 
1955 .121 T.'.O 2.1 7.4 24.6 17.2 8.7 
9.3 23.l 13.8 9.31956 .130 6.8 0 
1957 .157 6.2 7.5 6.4 22.4 16.0 9,6 
1958 .183 7.1 5.0 6.5 16.4 9. 9 21.0 14.5 9,7
 
1959 .200 6.7 4.0 10.1 15.9 5.8 20.3 10.2 10.4 
1960 .217 6.9 3.4 12.3 14.7 2.4 18.9 6.6 11. 5 
9.6 13.5 3. 9 18.0 8.4 12.71961 .241 6.9 3.4 
12.0 7 .9 16. 5 12.4 14.l1962 .279 8.1 3.4 4.1 
1963 .310 9.7 4.9 1.5 10.9 9.4 15.7 14.2 16.2 
1964 .337 11.1 3.3 .o· 10.2 9. 6 15. 0 14.4 18.4 
9.7 9.1 15. 0 14.4 20.l1965 .364" 10.8 2.2 .6 
4.7 1.8 9.4 7 .6 14. 7 12.9 21. 21966 .391 10.1 
3.9 9.1 5.2 14. 4 10.5 22.31967 .408 9.4
9.4 5.1 4.9 9.1 4.2 14.2 9.3 23.01968 .420 
5.0 9.1 4.1 13. 6 8.6 24.11969 .433 9.7 
9.0 5.3 12.9 9.2 26.01970 .473 10.4 3.1 3.7 
4.8 12. 0 8.31971 .531 11.2 12.l 3.7 8.5 
Notes: 
(1) line 34 (money) + line 35 (quasi-money) + line 45 (time and savings deposits) in International Financ 
Statistics, various issues. 
GDP (current): book value, at current prices from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1973 [TSDS]. 
1972 GDP used in calculations is preliminary estimate. 
(2) Same as for GDP (current) in (l); 1972 GDP used in calculations i~ preljminary estimate. 
(3) Not 3-year moving average; is% change from previous year only, 
those aged 12 and over engaged in agriculFor 1952-1966: refers to those employed (aged 12 and over) less 
For 1967-1972: refers to those employed (aged 15 and over) less those aged 15 and over engaged in agricul 
forestry, and fisheries (since 1969, including servicemen). ( From TSDS.) 
(4) % consumer price change in year from TSDS. 
(5) Average of (a) 6-month time deposits at banks (year-end interest rate per annum) (Source: The· Republ
ic of 
China, Taiwan Financial Statistics Monthly, April 1975 [TFSM]). 
(b) 1957-58: 1-year preferential time deposits from A.G. Chandarvarkar, IMF Staff Papers (197 
18:83. 
1959-1969: one year savings deposits in banks at year end (assumed compounding monthly 
at the monthly interest rate for year end). 
1970-1972: one year savings deposits in banks (year-end interest per year)[from TFSM]. 
(6) Nominal rates; effective rates may be higher: 
1953-55: secured time loans in banks at year P.nd (assumed compounding monthly at the monthly interest 
rate for year end) from TFSM. 
1956-69: same as for 1953-55, except "secured loans" instead of secured time loans. 
1970-72: secured loans at banks (year-end interest rate per annum). 
(7) From TSDS. GDP (current) as in (1). 
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While elements of credit rationing,of course,persisted, such changes 
in interest rate policy--even sharper in the case of South Korea where the 
policy changes occurred a few years later--do imply a much enhanced role 
forprivate saving via official intermediation channels and greater scope 
for the use of government monetary policy. As both Taiwan's and Korea's ex­
perience in the 60 1 s showed, once saver confidence has been reestablished, 
the relationship between interest and saving rates probably weakens, saving 
becomes more closely tied to changes in the level of incom~ and interest 
rates safely decline somewhat again, 
At the same time (i.e., the 60's), the institutional structure of 
financial intermediation became more diversified and sophisticated, and 
household savers for the time had really viable alternatives to the unhappy 
choice between direct investment and ~cceding to the government as a monop­
sony borrower. As a consequence, the gross saving rate for Taiwan, less 
than 10% in 1954-58, rose to more than 20% by the endo6f the 60's. Of this 
remarkable total, 70% came from household saving, more than 80% of which, 
in turn, made its way through financial channels. 
During this period, the real performance of the economy picked up con­
siderably. Agricultural labor productivity spurted (from 2% to 4% plus); 
the rate of labor reallocation, as indicated in Table 2, increased substan­
tially; and the growth rate moved from 7% to approximately 
10% annually. While overall exports grew at rates in 
excess of 30% annually by 1970--with more than 25% of the GDP exported-­
what is even more interesting is the tremendous shift in composition from 
traditional land-based to non-traditional labor-based commodities. By 1970, 
labor intensive industrial goods constituted more than 80% of total exports, 
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in contrast to 25% in the early 1950's. This major restructuring of 
output and export patterns meant that, by the end of the 1960's, employ­
ment in the industrial sector had increased at such a rate that, in spite 
of still substantial (if declining) population growth, the sui,plus labor 
conditions came to an end, as indicated by rapidly rising unskilled real 
wages after that point. 
A well-developed growing network of rural financial intermediation, 
via cooperative banks, farmer associations and commercial branch banking 
was, moreover, extremely helpful in ensuring that much of the industrial 
sector growth followed an efficient low cost pattern, much of it directed 
towards the expansion of rural industries, especially in food processing 
and in subcontracting for larger, including export~oriented, fi1"llls. It is 
a striking characteristic of the Taiwanese industrialization pattern that 
it remained efficiently labor intensive through most of the 60's providing 
employment to some of the poorest farmers; as a consequence, more than 50% 
of farm family income was derived from non-agriculture by the end of the 
1960's and the distribution of income in Taiwan remained one of the best in 
16the world during this period of rapid growth. 
In the (milder) case of historical Japan as well as in the contemporary case of 
Taiwan, we may thus note some approach to the idealized pattern described 
earlier. On the real side we encounter a gradual shift from land-intensive 
16The Gini level near .3 is remarkably low by LDC standards--mostly in 
the .5 range. Even more interesting is that the initial rise anticipated 
by Kuznets did not take place. This contrast, for income distribution,of a 
secondary import substitution vs.export substitution choice is currently 
under study but cannot be dealt with here. (See, however, J.C.H.Fei, G. 
Ranis, and S. Kuo, "Growth and the Family Distribution of Income by Factor 
Components: The Case of Taiwan," Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 
No. 223, March 1975 (revised April 1975).) 
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exports fuelling import substitution, to labor-intensive exports, with 
agriculture finally participating more fully via sustained productivity 
increase, and labor being reallocated, until the economy's labor surplus condi­
tion is ultimately exhausted and the transition to modern growth has been 
successfully negotiated. On the financial side, this requires the continued 
growth of a more and more complex financial intermediation system accommodating-­
and/or inducing--the generation and channelization of the agricultural sur­
pluses, with organized money markets gradually reducing the importance 
of parallel or dual markets, especially in rural areas, and providing fairer 
access to all comers. During this relatively market oriented export substitu­
tion sub-phase, we can thus expect the economy not only to obtain a higher 
level of efficiency but to be able to support a larger total effort, whether 
measured in terms of labor reallocation, rates of saving,or growth. 
III. The "Non-Deviant" LDC in Transition 
While the above export substitution path approaches some sort of 
idealized sequence, it has, in fact, been followed by only a small minority 
of so-called "deviant" LDC's. Most contemporary developing economies can 
be said to have more or less maintained their import substitution policy 
syndrome after the inevitable end of their primary import substitution sub­
phase of development. As was pointed out earlier, the choice of secondary 
import substitution at this point essentially means "more of the same"--
except more so. What is required basically is continuity of the policies 
previously in vogue--including with respect to financial institutions and 
policies. Specifically, in non-agr.iculture it means satisfying the ever 
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increasing appetite, for capital and technology, of the new capital goods, 
durable consumer goods and processing industries--especially, of course, 
those in the hands of prime borrowers--and continuing to accommodate to the 
rising requirement$ for overheads of the public sector; in agriculture, it 
essentially means maintenance of the force feeding of subsidized credit to 
large farmers, with relatively little attention to the effects on participa­
tion, on agricultural productivity, on default rates, or the generation of 
inter-sectoral saving. 
We, of course, recognize that these "choices" of growth paths, and of 
accompanying policy packages, are never quite as clear-cut as all this in 
real life, but tend to fade into each other at the edges. But while there 
certainly ~xist substantial elements of both secondary import substitution 
and export substitution in the overall production and trade structure of 
most LDC's, the contrasts painted here are both meaningful and instructive. 
The performance of such''typical" countries as Brazil and the Philippines is 
sharply differentiable from the deviant minority we were discussing in the 
last section. 
A labor surplus LDC which continues to persevere in traditional exports­
fuelled secondary import substitution long after its changing endowment 
would seem to render it capable of beginning to shift to non-traditional 
industrial exports is likely to encounter ever increasing capital and tech­
This means, in turn, that :the burdensnology requirements along the way. 
placed on the system's financial institutions, especially in te1'l!ls of the 
quantity of saving which must somehow be generated and channeled, are sub­
stantially increased. The capital requirements for processing, durable 
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and most capital goods industries are generally substantiallyconsumer 
larger than those applicable to non-durable consumer goods. Lumpiness is 
. ~. 
pronounced and public sector overhead and urbanization costs likelymore 
to increase. With the financial intermediation network, on the other hand, 
retaining, more or less, its import substitution characteristics previously 
described, the supply of domestic saving is not likely to increase pari passu. 
In fact, the resulting continued state of "financial repression," as Shaw 
calls it, means that neither the increased participation of households and 
of other medium and small savers nor the higher quality of allocation forced 
by greater competitive-pressures is likely to occur as long as the official 
policy of artificial low deposit and lending rates persists. Instead, there 
is an even greater likelihood of resort to inflationary financing, public 
and private, at home, plus even more fervent attempts to attract capital 
from abroad, via special tax treatment and favored access to domestic loan 
capital. Consequently, both the choice of technology and of output mix 
are likely to become more and more distorted in terms of a basic endowment 
which can be expected to shift only gradually from its labor-abundant/ 
capital-and-skill-short characteristic • 
.The accompanying relative neglect of food producing agriculture frequently 
leads not only to non-support from that sector--either via the domestic saving 
or foreign exchange route--but to the need to divert resources to the importa­
tion of foods. Ultimately, unless the outlook for the further expansion of 
natural resources-based exports is good--and/or foreign capital inflows make 
up the difference--customary rates of growth may not be long maintainable. 
And even if they are, increasing problems of maldistribution and unemployment 
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in the more and more capital-intensive labor surplus economy are bound to 
create more and more social and political stress and strain. Thus, for 
one reason or another--and possibly both--even countries which have· been 
navigating "successfully'through secondary import substitution waters, 
i.e., at 6%-8% growth rates, may sooner or later find themselves in 
difficulties. 
The post-World War II experience of the Philippines (see Table 3) may be 
viewed as representing one such case in point. Primary import substitution which 
started seriously after the War began to run out of steam by the end of 
the 1950's. Faced with a sharp deceleration in industrial growth and the 
inability to depend on a sluggish primary export sector to provide the 
necessary foreign exchange, the Government initially opted for devaluation 
and decontrol in the early 1960 1 s. However, for a number of reasons, in­
cluding the failure of food-producing agriculture to provide the necessary 
support in the form of productivity and saving increases, and government 
unwillingness to provide for real import liberalization by tackling the 
highly protective tariff structure, this incomplete venture into export 
substitution proved unsuccessful. Largely as a consequence,decisions, 
especially after 1968, can be said to have taken the Philippines firmly 
down the secondary import substitution path. Two decades of heavy protec-
tion have thus left the Philippines with an increasingly capital-intensive 
geographically highly concentrated industrial structure relying for its 
continued--if every more costly--growth on the expansion of traditional 
exports. In spite of respectable overall growth rates, in excess of 6% 





Non-Agricultural Inflation (Average of Int
erest on Gross
Real Secured Saving
3-Year GDP Labor Absorption (% price cha
nge 6 month and 
Ratefrom l year rates) LoansMoving Average M2 Growth (% change from Nominal Real Nominal Real (% of GDP
Centered on GDP ~current) Rate previous ear) reviou
s ear) 
5 6 7
1 2 3 4 ( a) (b) 
11.9-1.5A. 1954 .182 8.7 11. 82.11955 .186 7.7 12.61.91956 .195 5.7 13.12.21957 .198 5.1 1.5 13.7
J:958 .205 4.8 -4.7 .3 13.4
1959 .207 4.7 7.3 2.1 15.13.01960 .217 4.7 1. 2 4.4 7.8 3.4 16.9
1961 .234 2.7 8.0 8.0 2.3 19.2
1962 .250 5.0 3.5 5
.7 
8.0 .3 20.1
1963 .253 4.5 7.6 7
.7 
20.36.3 8. 3 21fJ1964 .244 6.1 8.8 3.6 20.25.21965 .241 4.9 9.4 4.7 20.06.2 4.7 5.8-6.3 1.1-1.61966 .257 3.9 
-2.31967 
3.6 6 - 6.3 2. 4-2. 7 9.9 6.3 21. 3
B. 1968 .282 6.7 -2.2- -1.5 10.4 2.. 1 21.43.1 -7.0 8.5 6.3-7.1969 .285 16.3 6.5-7. 7 -9.8- -8.6 11.0 -5.3 21.11970 • 277 5.1 20.86.5-8.0 11.4
1971 !265 4.8 
Notes: 
(1) M2 : line
 34 (money)+ line 35 (quasi-money)+ line 45 (time and sav
ings deposits) in International 
Financial Statistics, various issues. 
GDP (current): at current prices. 
For Section A: Statistical Reporter (1969), Vol. 13, No. 1
 (SR) 
For Section B: N.E.D.A., The National Income Accounts 1967
-1972 (Manila: 1973) [NEDA]. 
(2) Same as for GDP (current) in (1) for A: million, of 1955 
for B: million j of 1967 
(3) Not 3-year moving average; is% change from previous year only
 
"Non-agricultural" refers to employed persons in labor forc
e not engaged in agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fishing.
1957-1968: figures are for October--from 1971 Statistical 
Handbook of the Philippines (Bureau of the 
Census and Statistics, Manila). 
1969: figure calculated from May 1968 to May 1969 fro
m The BCS Survey of Households Bulletin, 
May, 1968, No. 25 and May 1969 No 27
% consumer price change in Manlla {December to December).(4) 1953-1957: 
% consumer price change for Philippines (December to December) from
 Statistical Bulletin
1958-1971: 
(Central Bank of the Philippines); various issues. 
( 5) From Philippine Financial Statistics (Cen
tral
Interest on time deposits in commercial banks at vear end. 
Bank of the Philippines), Decembe_r 1973 From Sharing in
( 6) Nominal rates for commercial banks (average tor year); e
ffective rates may be higher. 
ines (Geneva:
Develo ment: A Programme of Emplo ent, E uit , and Growth
 for the Phili 
ILO, 1974. 
(7) Same as for GDP (current) in (1). 
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industrial sector have been declining. Even more significant has been 
the increase in underemployment and the worsening distribution of income. 
The strikingly dualistic characteristic of Philippine development 
extends as well to its financial institutions and markets. A highly 
organized official market catering mainly to the large-scale urban indus­
trial sect-0r, on the one hand, and plantation-style export crops, on the 
other, exists side by side with unorganized markets serving small industrial 
enterprises (rural and urban) and food-producing agriculturalists. Nominal 
annual rates of interest at saving banks , governed by usury laws , remain 
in the vicinity of 12%-14% (with effective rates somewhat higher) while 
17
interest rates in the informal markets vary between 60 and 400 percent. 
Interest rates offered to deposit0rs are also regulated and even more in 
disequilibrium. Within the official market, small savers can obtain no 
more than 6%-8% nominal, but larger savers do have access to both commercial and 
government deposit substitutes which earn substantially more. In addition 
to the disequilibrium low levels of both organized sector deposit and loan 
rates, we may thus note the large legally induced "spread" creating what must be 
18
regarded as a regulated banking oligopoly. 
17contrast this with an estimated real rate of return (before taxes) 
on assets in manufacturing around 15% by the end of the 1960's leading to 
an average nominal rate of return of between 20% and 25% minimum (see 
Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, Equity and Growth for 
the Philippines, G. Ranis, ed., Geneva: International Labour Office, 1974). 
18
The argument by the banks that the present'spread"is necessary as 
compensation for services rendered as financial intermediaries must be 
judged to be largely spurious. Banks needing such a spread must be operating 
highly inefficiently, and the economy would generally stand to benefit from 
the elimination of same, which would result from the more competitive behaviour 
of the group. 
• • 
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The growth of financial institutions, measured either by the 
Goldsmith financial intermediation ratio or the (easier to obtain) rela­
tionship between M
1 
, M and GNP, first accelerated and then (by the late2 
60's)reversed direction. The banking system became more diversified and 
non-bank financial institutions grew substantially, but most of the growth, 
qualitative and quantitative, continued to affect the two enclave sectors. 
An examination of the distribution of loans actually made by the official 
banking system illustrates this further. Between 1958 and 1967, for 
instance, the smallest 20% of the loans absorbed less than 1% of the loans 
made, while the largest 20% of the loans absorbed more than 90% of loan 
0191· f" . . d d dva1ue. ittle 1nanc1al interme 1at1on was directe towar s extend.ing 
the capillary activities between these and agricultural plus small-scale 
20
(including rural) non-agricultural activities. The gross saving rate 
rose steadily towards a peak of 21% in the late 60's but has declined more 
or less consistently thereafter (19% in 1972). Yet the increasingly capital­
intensive and skill-intensive character of the industrialization process 
has heightened capital requirements and lowered the (social and even the 
,private) rate of return. Increasingly, in its efforts to prolong the import 
substitution regime, the Philippines has been forced to try to find new raw 
material sources (e.g., bananas and now oil). In the absence of a major 
break-through by virtue of the bounty of nature, we can thus anticipate an in­
creasingly costly industrial development pattern, with the terms of trade 
19
Default rates, among farmers, in the Philippines were in the 50-75% 
range in the mid-60's (see Gimenez, Mariano E., "Credit Delinquency," 
The Rural Banker, Vol. XIII, 9-10/1965, p. 47). 
Contrast this with the 5% level for Taiwan (Shen, T. H., The Sino-American 
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction: Twent Years of Coo eration for 
Agricultural Development Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970 , p. 205. 
20
The fastest growth was recorded in investment houses, trust funds and 
finance companies, less subject to fixed interest rate policies, but which 
effectively exclude participation by potential small savers. The same thing 
is true for such short-term papers as bankers' acceptances and Central Bank 
certificates of indebtedness, a market which serves institutional investors 
and wealthy families only. 
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deteriorating further and, given the secularly stagnant food producing 
agricultural sector, an increasing proportion of export proceeds having 
to be diverted to the importation of food. Moreover, given the inherently 
labor surplus condition of much of the Philippines, continuation along the 
present narrow growth path would, even in the advent of a new natural 
resources bonanza, be politically difficult to maintain in terms of the 
negative employment and distributional outcomes which can be expected. 
The post-War experience of Brazil (see Table 4) may be viewed as repre­
senting another historical illustration of the path most LDC's have, in fact, 
chosen. After transiting from primary to secondary import substitution in 
the 50 1s, Brazil by the early 60 1 s was experiencing all the previously stated 
symptoms of increased industrial inefficiency accompanied by increased financial 
"repression." On the real side we may note increasing industrial capital­
output ratios and stagnant, if high, saving rates--with the contribution of 
households, given severe inflation, minimal. Financial intermediation remained 
relatively stagnant, with Goldsmith's financial intermediation l"atio falling 
from 70% in 1948 to 55% in 1963. 21 
By the early 60's (see Table 4), even the rate of growth, fuelled by 
th, reinvestment of industrial profits, the effects of public sector deficit 
finance and increasingly reluctant foreign investors, was becoming somewhat 
anemic. By the .1·1~.d-1960' s corporate self-finance amounted to more than 8% 
of GNP. Brazil's balance of payments problems had begun to mount and her 
im.lation seemed out of control. 
21 rn fact, Goldsmith found that less than 3% of gross national saving 
was channeled through these intermediaries. For a relevant discussion of 
the Brazilian case, see Andre F. Montoro, "Some Aspects of the Recent 





Real Inflation Company Company 
3-Year GDP ( % price change Interest Rate Bill of Exchange Gross Saving
M2Moving Average Growth from for Borrower Yield Rate 
Centered on GDP (current) Rate Erevious iear) Nominal Real Nominal Real (% of GDP) 
m (2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) 
1961 . 282 8.4 43.2 23.9 -19.3 
1962 .271 5.7 60.1 28.6 -31. 5 19.9 
1963 .255 3.2 74.8 35.1 -39.6 21. 0 
1964 .250 2.4 69.2 37.8 -31.4 22.2 
1965 .238 3.6 54.9 37.8 21. l -17.l 
1966 ,240 4.2 32.6 34.9 2.3 72.8 40.2 20.3 
1967 .239 6.4 29.6 21.834.3 4.7 65,3 35.7 
1968 .255 7.7 23.5 •e:'j 33.9 10.4 57.·o 33.5 23.2 
1969 .264 9.3 21.6 33.1 11. 5 55.l 33.5 
1970 .275 9.9 19.6 31.0 11.4 53.8 34.2 
1971 . 301 10.4 18.6 28.4 9.8 52~4 33.8 
Notes: 
(1) M2: line 34 (money)+ l~ne 3: (qu~~i-mo~e~~ :n(ti~~n=~d3:a:!~g;5d;~~:i1~t=~n:~f ~~ly;~~~~cial0 0Fig~e :or 1965.savi~gs eposTi_s nond savi~gs deposits from Boletim do Banco Central do BrasilStatistics, various issues. 1me a 
(January 1974), Vol. 10, No. 1. N [CE]
GDP (current): at current prices from Conjuntura Economica (1973), Vol. 27 , o. 12 _ • 
1969-1972 GDP's are preliminary estimates. 
( 2) From CE 1969-1972 GDP's are preliminary estimates. h ) f CE 
_, · e upp Y ___ . _ .. rom ,( 3) Refers to General Price InciE=_x (Aggregat s 1 )--(December to December c ange 
( if.) To -I966 from NESS 
•1967-70: (Rio de Janeiro) 180-day loans for working capital compounded monthly at the average December monthly
interest rate from Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil (1974), Vol. 10. No. 9 [BOLETIM] • 
l~~l-V2: (Rio de Janeiro) 360-day loans for consumer credit compounded monthly at the average December monthly-· interest rate from Boletim. - ---
1967-70: (Rio de Janeiro) 180-days maturity; compounded monthly at the average December monthly interest 
rate from [BOLETIM]. l · 
.. ___ ,- ~ _.l,~71-72: (Rio de _,1-~neiro) _?_6.Q:-_<g1ys maturity (y~ar-end % interest rate__ per annum) from Bo eti~. 
(5) To 1966: refers to 6-month exchange bills from W. L. Ness in Economic Development and Cultural Change~ (1974)~ Vol. 22, No, 9 [NESS] 
(6) Flow of funds savings--estimate from NESS. 
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In the post-1964 period a new (military) government initiated a series 
of reforms, including devaluation o~ the exchange rate and partial abrogation 
of the anti-usury laws, which permitted a modest increase in the nominal 
rate of interest along with other components of a so-called export substitu­
tion or liberalization oriented policy package. At the same time, both the 
relative size and degree of diversification of the financial intermediation 
network increased significantly, accompanied by a narrowing of the interest 
rate spread between official and unofficial markets, on the one hand, and 
between lending and borrowing rates, on the other. Real interest rates 
gradually became substantially positive for the first time (see Table 4) as 
inflation declined from 70% levels to around 20% and nominal rates of interest 
rose as high as 50% for the case of finance company instruments. 22 Saving 
and loan associations and other specialized intermediaries assumed real impor­
tance for the first time--as witnessed by the fact that commercial banks were 
responsible for 94% of all loans to private borrowers in 1964, but for only 
61% of a much larger total by 1972. Government bonds, previously sold almost 
exclusively to the banking system, now began to attract private customers-­
23especially after the so-called monetary correction was introduced in 1968. 
Both the M2/GDP ratio and the saving rate reversed trend as a result of the 
reforms. What followed was a marked improvement in growth performance and, 
though we lack annual data, the rate of surplus labor absorbed in non-
22By using. t he device. of 1etters of exchange whose 1egal return was 
fixed but which could sell at a substantial discount. 
is permits t h d f d a . many 
23Th. . e in. exation. o government bon s 1ong with 
other monetary instruments. The overall role of indexation is a most in­
teresting but large subject and cannot really be dealt with in the context 
of this paper. 
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agricultural activities undoubtedly increased. Much of this additional 
labor absorption was reflected in such labor-intensive areas as footwear 
and related to a substantial export boom in recent years. 
Nevertheless, as in the case of the Philippines in the early 60's, 
it is not at all clear whether Brazil has really determined to gradually 
shift to an export substitution type of growth path, whether she is back­
sliding or simply experiencing random oscillations in policy. Certainly, 
the experience of the most recent past provides room for doubt. Perhaps 
most important is the fact that the level of effective protection of Brazilian 
industry has undoubtedly again increased substantially,that more than 60% of 
the spectacular increase in exports in the early 70's was in primary products, 
and that an increasing proportion of her industrial exports was in the durable 
consumer and processed goods area and heavily subsidized. 24 Certainly Brazil's 
current emphasis on high technology and capital intensive industries, e.g., 
in petro-chemicals, atomic energy, etc., in the presence of a still very 
substantial overhang of surplus labor,seems to argue in favor of the inter­
pretation that the center of gravity may be shifting back towards a policy 
of secondary import substitution--if somewhat milder than in many other 
direct-controls-oriented LDC's. Growth rates are beginning to decline again; 
but, perhaps more significant is Brazil's unfavorable, and apparently worsening, 
25• d" .b • dincome istri ution recor. 
24such subsidies are provided by the government in terms of differential 
interest charges, tax exemptions, rebates, etc. Moreover, multinationals are 
asked to export below cost in return for continuing to enjoy guaranteed high 
profits in the domestic market. Such "pushing out" of industrial exports 
may be termed "export promotion" to distinguish it from the more organic 
dynamic resource endowment-sensitive process of "export substitution." 
25 see Al Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," American 
Economic Review, May 1972. 
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IV. Summary.and Conclusions 
As we have tried to show in an admittedly somewhat heuristic fashion, 
the appropriate developmental role of financial institutions and policies 
cannot be satisfactorily assessed independent of time and place. Instead, 
for the typical labor surplus economy, we have tried to differentiate among 
the functions to be performed in each phase of the transition process. This, 
in turn, has permitted us, with the help of some real world illustrations, 
to differentiate between an idealized or "deviant" and a more realistic 
or "non-deviant" pattern in the actual evolution of financial institutions 
and policies in the contemporary developing world. 
The contrasts between these two sets are substantial and instructive. 
The deviant LDC utilizes its primary import substitution sub-phase not only 
to protect its fledgling entrepreneurs but also to construct the financial 
and physical infrastructure required subsequently, pays due attention to 
agricultural productivity increase, and transits before long into export 
substitution. It requires the help of a policy reform package and a finan­
cial intermediation structure flexihle with respect to the changing tastes 
for real and financial assets as well as changing investor competence. 
The non-deviant LDC elects to move from primary to secondary import sub­
stitution, a move which implies an increasingly capital and skill intensive 
growth path and pressure for a continuation and, in fact, intensification 
of the existing policy package. This includes the relative neglect of agri­
culture and, with low participation by households and relatively narrow 
official intermediation markets, heavy reliance on public, corporate and 
foreign saving in satisfying rapidly growing industrial capital requirements. 
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Both sets of countries may show relatively good growth performance, 
but the first as a consequence of a gradual shift to fuller human resources 
utilization, the second via enhanced reliance on the natural resources base 
and/or foreigners. Pronounced difft~rences are likely to appear even for 
those blessed with really abundant natural resources, i.e., in the income 
distribution and unemployment dimensions of development; and certainly for 
those not quite so lucky there arise questions as to the longer term prospects 
of maintaining a satisfactory rate of growth itself--at least without incurring 
a prohibitively high structure of foreign debt. 
If all but the really exceptional cases (e.g., the oil countries) are 
thus likely to run into increasing difficulties--as they, in fact, have-­
why, it may well be asked, does the majority of LDC's not shift their 
policies towards export substitution and away from secondary import sub~ 
. . is, we believe, that it is politic-st1tut1on.?26 A large part of the answer 
ally difficult to do so. The changes contemplated threaten not only the 
unearned profits of the new industrial elite but also the controls-related power 
(and incomes) of the bureaucracy. Small wonder that policy-makers--who are 
presumably just as human as the rest of us--would prefer to avoid taking the 
unpleasant medicine of devaluation,credit and import liberalization if it can 
be avoided. The actual (or putative) availability of a friendly Mother Nature-­
and/or foreign donors--is ideally suited to strengthening the natural 
temptation to leave things more or less as they are. Policy makers in our 
26
It could, of course, be because the reasoning underlying this paper 
is seriously deficient; but this possibility is arbitrarily excluded. 
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"deviant" minority group of LDC's, it should be noted, are not necessarily 
smarter or more virtuous, but rather more "up against it," without recourse 
to the same pleasant alternatives. Thus while, in theory, additional 
resources--whether via the bounty of nature or foreign lenders--should be 
all to the good, i.e. , provide an additional potential advantage to a 
country contemplating a painful transition from one sub-phase to another, 
it may, in fact, not work that way in the realm of political economy. 
This is, in fact, akin to a generalized version of the so-called "Kuwait Effect" 
on a country's exchange rate and balance of payments. 
All this, of course, does not imply, that the majority of contemporary 
LDC's do not consider exports--especially industrial exports--hi.ghly desirable 
and are willing to go to some lengths to achieve a better perfor~ance in 
this regard. Even such strong proponents of import substitution strategies 
as Prebish have substantially moderated their views in recent years. But 
the difference is that the exports being generated by and large result from 
policies which "push out" exports artificially without a basic change in the 
import substitution environment. Notice, for example, that a substantial 
portion of the industrial exports of such countries as Brazil and Mexico in 
recent years has not been in the field of relatively labor intensive non­
durables but in such capital and skill intensive areas as durable consumer 
goods. This attempt at an export orientation--which may be called "export 
promotion"--is thus not to be confused with "export substitution" caused by the 
gradually evolving play of comparative advantage,as liberalization replaces 
infant industry protection--but is rather the result of policies intended 
to subsidize industrial exports while maintaining the hot-house temperatures 
of import substitution. 
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Institutional devices are often created to help promote exports, 
e.g. , the use of interest rate differentials and"special windows". Fiscal 
incentives are given and, finally, companies, including the multi-nationals, 
are pressured directly to export a certain portion of their output, even if 
below cost, in exchange for the guarantee of the maintenance of high unearned 
profits on the rest of their output in the protected domestic market. Thus 
the increased value of industrial exports by itself does not necessarily signal 
a switch to a more endowment sensitive growth path; nor does the establish­
ment of additional specialized financial facilities to encourage industrial 
exports. An examination of value added at international prices will indicate 
that "crimes" committed in the name of export promotion can be just as 
costly as those committed in the name of the no longer as fashionable import 
substitution. As long as the golden goose of natural resources abundance 
doesn't give out--and/or the political problems attending a worsening dis­
tributional outcome can be handled--negative value added on both fronts can 
be "afforded." In any case, without the--often admittedly painful--changes 
in policy described earlier, the transition to a more efficient, broadly 
participatory growth path cannot be effected. 
What is required, in short, is an uncommonly high degree of statesman­
ship. Mobilizing the rural sector early and in a sustained and persistent 
fashion; building the financial infrastructure required for the effective 
channelization of the resulting surpluses; and, finally, permitting the 
industrial sector to help finance its own future growth via export substitu­
tion all imply government actions challenging old habits and deeply entrenched 
interests. Small wonder that the greater the opportunity provided by natural 
resources or foreign capital the greater the temptation to use it instead 
to help postpone the day of reckoning. 
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Navigating towards economic maturity via some approximation to the 
idealized path sketched here--both real and financial--thus requires both 
technical competence and the political will to secure the necessary agreement 
among the various parties to the social contract. That some groups, e.g., 
small farmers, medium-scale entrepreneurs, and other economically disen­
franchised elements would be likely to benefit from the proposed change of 
strategy is clear enough. But the fact that even the landlords and large­
scale industrialist class stands to benefit, over the longer term, from a 
more rational interest rate policy, for instance, is less obvious. Such a 
change in the environment will call for a change in the way profits, or 
rents, are earned but not necessarily in the volume or even in the relative 
shares. A shift from monopoly to earned profits is likely to mobilize 
substantial underutilized entrepreneurial,managerial and innovative 
resources for the first time and thus lift the entire performance of the system 
onto new tracks. The alternative may well be that, in spite of all efforts 
to prop up declining rates of return, dwindling domestic markets and the 
increasingly difficult process of fuelling import substitution while pulling 
along a recalcitrant agricultural sector, will eventually boomerang for 
the ver;_r urban industrial class it is intended to protect. 
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